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German Council on Foreign Relations
Germany Between 
a Rock and a Hard 
Place in China-US 
Competition
The Biden administration has just is-
sued its Interim National Security Stra-
tegic Guidance. The guidance document 
states the need to “build back better at 
home” and acknowledges that “interna-
tional economic policies must serve all 
Americans” – a theme often referred to 
as “foreign policy for the middle class”. 
While the interim guidance does not pre-
clude cooperation with China in selected 
policy areas, it is unambiguous in con-
sidering China a strategic competitor. 
The prospect of intensifying China-US 
geopolitical and (geo)economic compe-
tition is bad news for Germany, which 
has high value trading and investment 
relationships with both countries.
COMPETING STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS
It comes as no surprise that the Biden 
administration refers to China as a stra-
tegic competitor. Conflicting strategic 
interests have been pushing the United 
States and China towards competition 
and confrontation for quite some time. 
For more than a century, US grand 
strategy has sought to prevent the 
emergence of a hegemonic power on 
either side of the Eurasian landmass. 
A hegemonic power in Europe or East 
Asia would have the potential to threat-
en US security and it might lead to the 
US being economically excluded from 
major overseas markets. Whenever a 
state has threatened to dominate Eu-
rope or East Asia, the US has ended up 
going to war. This was the case in the 
First World War, Second World War, 
and the Cold War. 
China, on the other hand, considers 
the US’s extensive alliances and mili-
tary presence in Asia a potential threat 
to its security and domestic political 
stability. China’s increasing integra-
tion into the international economy 
over the past four decades has trans-
lated into increased dependence on 
overseas trade. This has created new 
economic and political vulnerabilities, 
particularly with respect to strategic 
and essential imports, like energy. 
China is eager to mitigate its vulnera-
bilities and, thanks to its economic rise, 
is now in a position to credibly con-
test the US military presence in Asia. 
China sees the US presence in the re-
gion as providing Washington with the 
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ically and politically, while China’s in-
creasing power and assertiveness have 
the US worried about its own strategic 
position in East Asia. In short, conflict-
ing strategic interests and mutual secu-
rity concerns fuel the fire of China-US 




The modernization of China’s mili-
tary puts increasing pressure on the 
US position in the region. In addition 
to China’s investment in asymmetric 
capabilities (e.g. anti-satellite and an-
ti-ship ballistic missiles), its maritime 
strategy of “near seas defense and far 
seas protection” and its construction 
of a blue water navy capable of oper-
ating on the open seas give Washing-
ton cause for concern. 
The logic driving the expansion of Chi-
na’s navy is easy to understand given its 
increased dependence on international 
trade and increased need to defend the 
maritime shipping routes it depends 
on. So does its so-called String of Pearls 
strategy that is meant to protect Chi-
na’s international trade routes and sup-
port its import and export activity. 
Meanwhile, US military doctrine and 
concepts such as offshore control, 
which are designed to limit China’s ac-
cess to the open sea, heightens Chi-
nese security concerns about so-called 
chokepoints and its ability to keep 
trade routes open. China is challenging 
the territorial and maritime status quo 
in the East and South East China Sea 
in order to push out its security pe-
rimeter. In other words: China and the 
US find themselves faced with a clas-
sic security dilemma; or, as Graham Al-
lision has put it, a Thucydides trap, de-
scribing an apparent tendency towards 
war when a rising power threatens to 
displace an ruling one.
Security competition between the two 
countries has also spilled over into the 
economic and technological realm, un-
dermining trust even further. Washing-
ton has not been shy about weaponiz-
ing economic interdependence by, for 
example, limiting Chinese access to key 
US technologies (e.g. semiconductors) 
or imposing new tariffs on Chinese im-
ports or tightening investment restric-
tions targeting China. 
Being in the weaker position, China’s 
response has been proportional rath-
er than escalatory. But it has spurred 
China to address the risks and vulner-
abilities arising from economic inter-
dependence through diversification 
(e.g. EU-China investment treaty), re-
gional economic integration (e.g. Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Part-
nership, Belt and Road Initiative) and 
greater emphasis on indigenous eco-
nomic and technological capabilities 
(e.g. Made in China 2025, China Stan-
dards 2035, Dual Circulation strate-
gy). All of these policies aim to reduce 
China’s economic-technological vul-
nerability in the context of intensifying 
China-US security competition. Tech-
nological competition has kicked into 
full gear and both sides are also seek-
ing to limit their interdependence in 
terms of other critical goods (e.g. ra-
re earth minerals and semiconductors). 
Such a decoupling policy reduces vul-
nerability at the expense of otherwise 




CHINA IN THE US
A decade and a half ago, senior US gov-
ernment officials were hoping that 
China – benefitting from the existing 
international economic and political 
order – would become a “responsible 
stakeholder”. Officials also believed (or 
rather hoped) that economic modern-
ization would lead to domestic politi-
cal liberalization, which might in turn 
make it easier for China to rise peace-
fully – meaning that China would em-
brace the principles, norms and in-
stitutions on which the open liberal 
international order is based. But things 
didn’t turn out as the US had hoped. 
In fact, it is next to impossible to find 
any senior government official, mem-
ber of congress or think-tanker in 
Washington D.C. today who is not a 
China hawk or at least a China skeptic. 
For a start, virtually all the Biden ad-
ministration officials occupying senior 
positions in the national security and 
economic realm are firmly critical of 
China. After all, most of them served in 
the Obama administration and experi-
enced first-hand how the US-China re-
lationship deteriorated. Many of those 
officials and staffers got their wake-
up call when President Xi reneged on 
his 2015 promise not to militarize the 
disputed artificial islands in the South 
China Sea. 
That said, officials in the Biden ad-
ministration are not ideolog ical 
“China-bashers”, in spite of the admin-
istration’s renewed emphasis on a val-
ue-based US foreign policy. They ac-
cept strategic competition as a fact of 
International factors and domestic 
political dynamics point to a more 
hawkish China policy.
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life but strive for “competition without 
catastrophe” in the words of foreign 
policy hands and senior Biden admin-
istration officials Jake Sullivan (nation-
al security advisor) and Kurt Campbell 
(Indo-Pacific “czar”). They also be-
lieve that it is necessary to engage and 
seek cooperation with China in select-
ed areas (e.g. climate change and public 
health), but they accept that the overall 
relationship is and will remain compet-
itive, perhaps even adversarial. Across 
the US administration, Washington 
D.C.’s political class and the think tank 
world, there is an almost unanimous-
ly-held view that the US needs to com-
pete with, and – where necessary – 
confront, China. 
Not only is a hawkish China policy one 
of the very issues that commands bi-
partisan support of the political class 
these days. But, according to Pew Re-
search, public opinion is also taking 
an increasingly negative view of Chi-
na. A recent poll from Pew Research 
showed that three-quarters of Ameri-
cans have a negative view of China. Al-
though some of the negative polling 
is due to the pandemic, popular opin-
ion is unambiguously anti-China. Few 
elections will be won by being “soft” 
on China. Corporate America hasn’t 
turned against China in the same way, 
but it has become more skeptical. Lim-
ited access to Chinese markets, Chi-
nese competition, and China’s indus-
trial and technology policies that often 
disadvantage foreign companies have 
led many (but not all) sectors to be-
come more wary of China. Both inter-
national factors and domestic political 
dynamics point to a more competitive 




What will the Biden administration’s 
China policy look like? The US will seek 
to deter China militarily and reassure 
regional allies by strengthening its mil-
itary presence and diversifying its mil-
itary footprint in the region as well as 
by tightening its alliances (e.g. Japan, 
South Korea, Australia) and coordinat-
ing more closely with actual and poten-
tial security partners (e.g. India, Viet-
nam). It is less clear what the Biden 
administration will do in the econom-
ic sphere. The US is not sufficiently en-
gaged in the region to prevent its al-
lies from becoming more dependent 
on China. The Biden administration is 
not likely to re-join the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (or the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacif-
ic Partnership, as it is now known) giv-
en its lack of appetite to engage in any 
kind of trade liberalization. While the 
US will move to strengthen security co-
operation with its allies and partners, 
its economic strategy will be lacking. 
The Biden administration will continue 
to privilege national security over eco-
nomic cooperation. Policies aimed at 
strategic technological and econom-
ic decoupling will likely become less 
broad and more targeted and effec-
tive. The US will also continue to push 
for the creation of a level playing field 
and will seek to enroll the support of 
its European and Asian allies. However, 
this is unlikely to deliver much prog-
ress given China’s backtracking on 
market reforms and increasing con-
cerns in Beijing about giving up gov-
ernment control over the economy at 
a time of mounting international secu-
rity competition. This does not mean 
that compromise is impossible, but a 
grand bargain that creates a level play-
ing field between the US and China is 
not on the cards, no matter what pol-
icy the Biden administration pursues.
BAD NEWS FOR GERMANY
The US and China are Germany’s first 
and second largest export markets, ac-
counting for a combined 6-8 percent of 
Germany’s GDP. In terms of total trade, 
China is Germany’s largest trading 
partner. For a large number of German 
companies, China is their largest and 
fastest-growing market. The US and 
China are also the most important and 
third most important destinations for 
German foreign direct investment. 
Intensifying China-US geostrategic 
and (geo)economic competition is like-
ly to land Germany between a rock 
and a hard place. China-US rivalry may 
lead both the US and China to pressure 
Germany to support their respective 
policies, including economic decou-
pling, export controls, investment con-
trols, etc. Germany’s economic depen-
dence on both China and the US make 
it particularly vulnerable and suscep-
tible to diplomatic pressure from both 
Beijing and Washington D.C.
The EU may well consider China a 
strategic rival and an economic com-
petitor. And Berlin may find much to 
criticize about China’s economic poli-
cies and an uneven level play field. But 
no-one can wish away the fact that 
China is of major economic impor-
tance to Germany. Meanwhile, the US 
remains Germany’s largest export mar-
ket, the most important destination of 
foreign direct investment and a crucial 
provider of advanced, including foun-
dational and emerging technology. The 
intensification of China-US competi-
tion will create many losers. Germany 
is going to be one of them.
Germany is going to be a loser in  
the growing China-US competition.
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